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The Space Weather Threat to Situational Awareness, 
Communications, and Positioning Systems 
 
Abstract— A recent space weather headline has cast doubt in 
the minds of some as to whether space weather is the source of 
spacecraft anomalies, and thus, whether it is important in the 
design and operation of critical situational awareness, 
communications, and positioning systems.  In this paper, we 
reiterate the evidence for the importance of space weather, its 
role in producing spacecraft and ground anomalies, and the 
threat it poses to critical systems.  In addition, we report new 
studies broken down by anomaly types and suggest the sources of 
the anomalies (surface charging or interior charging).  Finally, 
we suggest spacecraft charging and ground effects mitigation 
strategies for design and operations of systems critical to our 
modern civilization. 
Keywords—space weather; situational awareness; 
communications; positioning systems 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We’ve known for well over a century that space weather 
can affect life on earth.  These effects are particularly 
significant for long distance communications systems.  
Indeed, the enormous solar event of 1859, the Carrington 
Event knocked out telegraphs throughout North America and 
Europe.  With the advent of space-based communications 
systems in the last 50 years the potential impact of space 
weather on long-distance communications has grown 
significantly.  Space-weather induced satellite failures and 
outages can be devastating on both commercial and military 
operations.  There is also a significant problem with the 
exponentially growing networks including both space and 
ground-based links.  As with the Carrington event, modern 
ground based networks are vulnerable to electromagnetic 
consequences of space weather.  In this paper, we review 
space weather and how it influences crucial military and 
commercial systems, emphasizing situational awareness, 
communications, and positioning.  The purpose is to counter 
misleading or false headlines that may give the impression 
that space weather is not important [1], and to provide solid 
advice on how to deal with Space Weather threats. 
II. SPACE WEATHER – WHAT CAUSES IT 
The Sun is a typical G2 type star – a ball of hot plasma 
about 865,000 miles in diameter (100 times as big as Earth).   
It is rotating, but instead of rotating like a solid body, it 
differentially rotates – the rotation period is ~ 25 days at the 
equator and ~30 days at the poles (average ~ 27 days).  It has a 
magnetic field caused by the dynamo effect. The differential 
rotation of the plasma (to which the magnetic field lines are 
attached) twists and untwists the magnetic field lines making 
the magnetic field increase and decay, and change sign every 
11 years (the “sunspot cycle”). When the field is most twisted, 
it “breaks through” the visible surface, causing sunspots, 
flares, and coronal mass ejections (CMEs).  This is called 
“solar max”, the time of greatest “solar activity”. When the 
field is smooth, there are few or no sunspots, and the solar 
activity is at a minimum (“solar min”). The earth’s space 
environment is modified by the outflowing “solar wind” on a 
timescale of minutes to weeks by solar activity.  This is called 
“space weather.” 
A. Space Weather – The Solar Cycle 
In Fig. 1 [2] are the historical solar cycle average yearly 
sunspot numbers from the beginning of record–keeping in the 
1750’s.  Fig. 2 [3] shows average monthly sunspot numbers 
for the most recent solar cycles, with speculative estimates for 
the current cycle (24) and the next (25).  In Fig. 3 [4] are the 
current sunspot measurements for cycle 24. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Historical Solar Cycles 
 
Fig. 2. Recent Solar Cycles – we are in #24 now. 
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Fig. 3. Current average monthly sunspot numbers with a prediction for the rest 
of cycle 24. 
 
B. Space Weather – Phenomenology 
Solar Flares emit copious radio waves, x-rays and 
relativistic electrons and protons. The x-rays reach Earth and 
ionize some of the upper atmosphere in only 8 minutes – there 
is no warning, since we see the flare by light & radio waves 
that arrive at the same time as the x-rays.  Next to arrive are 
the relativistic protons (Solar Energetic Particles, or SEPs) 
which can reach Earth in about another 10 minutes.  When 
solar flares erupt, the can also eject large blobs of magnetized 
plasma called Coronal Mass Ejections (CMEs) traveling at 
speeds upward of 2x106 mph.  This means they can hit Earth 
within 2-4 days. 
 
CMEs are very directional, and most miss Earth entirely.  
Those that hit can distort the magnetosphere, but to get in 
must be funneled down through the polar regions. The extra 
plasma load can stretch the magnetosphere back out away 
from the sun, and when the magnetic field lines “break,” they 
snap back, accelerating electrons and protons to energies as 
high as 80,000 keV.  This is called a Geomagnetic Storm. 
GEO satellites (at 6.6 Earth radii) may be impacted within 
minutes, and the B-field of the whole magnetosphere and 
ionosphere in ½ hour. Aurorae are caused by the interaction of 
the entering plasma with Earth’s upper atmosphere, causing it 
to fluoresce like a neon sign. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Schematic of Sun-Earth Interactions [5]. 
C. Space Weather – Numbers Used for Solar Activity 
There are several numbers used to characterize the solar 
activity.  Brief descriptions follow: 
1) SSN (SunSpot Number) or Z (Zurich SSN) – The 
number of sunspots visible on the sun’s near-side, 
weighted by areas and groups of spots. 
2) F10.7 – The solar flux in the 10.7 cm radio 
wavelength. 
3) Solar Flare X-ray Strength – A, B, C, M, X from 
weakest to strongest. 
4) Kp – planetwide 3-hour disturbance in Earth’s 
magnetic field. Goes from 0-9, ≥5 = geomagnetic 
storm. 
5) Ap – weighted daily average of Kp, nonlinearly 
related to Kp. Kp of 5 is Ap of 48. 
6) Dst – hourly Kp-like average from 4 observatories 
7) Solar Wind Speed – 300-2000 km/s, stronger CMEs 
are ejected with higher speed. 
a. 2 MeV electron flux – can penetrate satellite 
radiation shielding 
b. 10 MeV proton flux – can penetrate satellite 
radiation shielding 
8) TEC – total electron content.  Line-of-sight measure 
important to radio scintillation. 
 
III. SPACE WEATHER IMPACTS 
A. Impacts on Earth 
Below is a short list of ways that space weather can impact 
systems on Earth. 
1) Power Grid Outages – due to high voltages induced on 
long power lines by rapid changes in Earth’s magnetic 
field (Dst very high) and the tightly woven power 
grid.  A good example is 13 March, 1989 (cycle 22) – 
the collapse of Hydro-Québec power grid, putting 6 
million people without power. 
2) Transportation disruptions – due to navigation and 
switching problems.  A good example is 13 May, 
1921 (cycle 15) – the NY Central Railroad was put 
out of operation due to electrical fires from 
overstressed electrical transformers.  Transpolar 
flights may be cancelled or rerouted due to space 
weather radiation fluxes that do not usually reach 
Earth because they are stopped in the atmosphere.  
And, instrument landings may be curtailed due to GPS 
outages from scintillation or GPS malfunctions due to 
high solar radiation fluxes. 
3) Communications and Radar Disruptions.  Good 
examples are the following: 
a) 1-2 September, 1859 (cycle 10) – telegraph 
outages, fires (the Carrington Event).   Largest 
known historical event. 
b) 13 May, 1921 (cycle 15) – telephone, telegraph 
and cable outages. 
c) 2 August, 1972 (cycle 20) – telephone outages, 
components damaged in Canadian overseas cable 
service. 
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d) 4 November, 2003 (cycle 23) – radio blackout 
e) Cell phone, GPS and radar reception may also be 
compromised 
4) Aurorae.  Examples follow: 
a) 21 December, 1806 (cycle 5) – first known 
association of aurorae with magnetic storm. 
b) 1-2 September, 1859 (cycle 10) – aurorae seen as 
far south as Cuba and Hawaii. 
c) 13 May, 1921 (cycle 15) – aurorae at zenith in 
Pasadena, CA. 
d) 2 August 1972 (cycle 20) – seen from Illinois to 
Colorado. 
e) 13 March, 1989 (cycle 22) – seen as far south as 
Texas [13]. 
B. Impacts on Satellites 
Why are satellite disruptions (“anomalies”) important?  It 
is because satellites are the basis of our technological 
civilization: 
• Communications [TV, telephones (land and mobile) – 
communications satellites] 
• Timekeeping (GPS) 
• Navigation (GPS) 
• Transportation (Air Traffic Control – GPS, train and truck 
tracking - GPS) 
• Agriculture (Planting and harvesting - GPS) 
• Wildlife Management (GPS) 
• Earthquake, Volcano, Weather and Climate Monitoring 
(GPS) 
• Defense (Surveillance and other intelligence, weapons 
guidance) 
 
What satellite systems can be affected?  All satellite 
systems, including: 
• Power (solar arrays and batteries) 
• Payload 
• Telemetry (including high-power communications) 
• Position and Attitude Control 
• Propulsion 
 
1) Sources and Types of Satellite Anomalies 
 
There are two major sources of satellite anomalies, surface 
charging and deep-dielectric charging.  Surface Charging may 
produce electrostatic discharges (ESDs) and arcing on solar 
arrays and power cables, and these may reach sensitive 
spacecraft electronics by radiation or conduction into nearby 
cables.  Surface charging is typically caused by electrons of 5-
50 keV energies in GEO, 2-20 keV in PEO, or high voltage 
arrays in LEO. 
 
Deep Dielectric Charging may produce arcing internally to 
spacecraft.  It is caused by the total dose of electrons of 200 
keV to 3 MeV energies, or protons of > 10 MeV energy, or 
prompt SEPs or X-rays (usually f very high energies), that can 
pass through spacecraft surface or shielding materials.  
Interior electronic upsets called Single Event Upsets (SEUs) 
are caused by the ionization trail of single high energy 
particles in sensitive electronics. 
 
The types of effects caused by surface or deep-dielectric 
discharges include transient effects (bit flips in electronics or 
EMI-produced spurious commands or software upsets) or 
more permanent damage (arcs, ESDs, and microchannel plate 
saturation that may damage electronics, and/or cause power 
cabling or solar array failure).  While more rare than transient 
effects, their permanent nature makes these types of effects 
devastating to satellite operation. 
 
C. Causes and Effects of Space Weather-Produced 
Anomalies 
Usually, failures of satellite systems to perform or operate 
properly are called anomalies.  In order of their immediacy of 
effect, these may be caused by the following solar 
interactions: 
• Flares.  Flares have an immediate impact on HF radio 
communications due to ionization in of the D layer in 
Earth’s ionosphere by prompt X-rays.  Flares may also 
produce a long-term impact by heating the upper 
atmosphere by large fluxes of UV-EUV radiation and this 
increases atmospheric drag on orbiting satellites.   
• The Radio Bursts that often accompany flares can knock 
out GPS navigation systems and interfere with 
communications and radar.  One example is the large 
event of 2006 Dec 06 which occurred after the impulsive 
phase of a flare.  It knocked out GPS for 20 minutes and 
affected cell phone reception. This is a definite issue for 
the increased use of UAVs and for aircraft landing. Flare 
prediction is an active area, helped by our new ability to 




Fig. 5.  Radio bursts on Dec 6 2006 and the associated GPS dropouts [6]. 
 
• Solar Energetic Particles (SEPs) are protons with energies 
~1 GeV that pose a radiation hazard for astronauts and 
polar flights, can affect satellite electronics, and affect 
polar cap absorption in the ionosphere.  They can come 
from flares or CMEs, and can arrive within 10 minutes of 
a flare.  vxB forces in the geomagnetic field control the 
entry of SEPs, and they are more important at earth’s 
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magnetic poles than at the equator.  The largest events 
(ground level enhancements, or “GLEs”) are seen by 
neutron monitors; high-energy protons produce neutrons 
by nuclear interactions in the atmosphere and can reach 
detectors on the ground.  SEP prediction is similar to 
flares, but not all large flares produce SEPs. 
 
Fig. 6.  High energy proton fluxes measured by the NOAA GOES-
11 satellite [6]. 
 
• Coronal Mass Ejections (CMEs) are large eruptions of 
mass moving outward from the Sun at ~1000 km/s, 
generally associated with flares, that take 2-4 days to 
arrive at Earth and can generate magnetospheric storms.  
In order to predict the severity of CMEs, one needs to 
know whether they will strike Earth, and what the 
magnetic field orientation is.  Southerly magnetic fields 
provide more compression of the Earth’s magnetic field, 
and compression of the magnetosphere can affect power 
systems, radiation belts, and ionospheric communication 




Fig. 7.  A CME captured by the Solar Dynamics Observatory 
(SDO) [6]. 
 
• Corotating Interaction Regions (CIRs) arise when fast 
moving solar wind particles gushing out of a coronal hole 
(a spot in the sun’s corona where the field lines are not 
closed) catch a slower flow ahead and the plasma 
becomes compressed. As the CIRs reach the upper layers 
of our atmosphere, they can cause high levels of activity 
in the ionosphere. To date, predictions when CIR events 
will arrive at Earth have been flawed, in that observations 
of the features close to the Sun underestimate the speed 
that they are moving by the time they cross Earth's orbit. 
 
Fig. 8.  CIR production in the interplanetary solar wind flow [7]. 
 
     The effects of Sun-Earth interactions on operations at Earth 
are many.  In the following we group some of them: 
 
• Orbital Drag Predictions for LEO.  These depend on the 
atmospheric neutral density, which depends on the 
heating experienced by the ionosphere.  High heating by 
high solar activity can lead to errors in satellite orbital 
predictions.  The USAF tries to keep track of all satellites 
an all detectable orbital debris in order to predict (and 
mitigate if possible) satellite collisions and to ascribe 
satellite explosions as due to collisions with other 
satellites or debris or to hostile acts.  Our current model 
neutral density error is ~15% during geomagnetic quiet  
times & > 50% during magnetic storms! A data 
assimilative physical model will reduce orbit prediction 
error.  However, for high accuracy drag models, we must 
have improved geomagnetic storm formulation and 
prediction capabilities. 
• Scintillation - loss of communication.  RF signals are 
refracted by irregularities in the ionosphere, leading to 
phase & amplitude variations called scintillation.  During 
quiet times, scintillation will occur mostly at only very 
high and very low latitudes.  However, during magnetic 
storms, the equatorial ionosphere becomes Rayleigh-
Taylor unstable to the formation of plasma bubbles, and 
scintillation can occur at all latitudes.  Scintillation occurs 
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mainly at night during both quiet and active times, and its 
intensity depends on F10.7.  Its impacts on systems 
include reducing or eliminating satellite & HF 
communication options.  Real-time targeting depends on 
“instant” communication, which is compromised when 
scintillation is severe.  Higher bandwidth systems have 
increased vulnerability. High fluxes of X-rays and SEPS 
can lead to loss of Communications at high latitudes from 
polar cap absorption events.  And, radio bursts directly 
interfere with GPS, communications and radar systems. 
• Scintillation - Degraded navigation.  Ionosphere 
disturbances degrade GPS systems.  This can have severe 
impacts on DoD systems which rely on a multitude of 
GPS receivers.  Reducing collateral damage depends on 
accurate precision guided munitions, and this depends on 
accurate GPS fixes. 
 
Fig. 9. Scintillation seen in the received signal from C/NOFS, the 
Communication/Navigation Outage Forecast System satellite [8]. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Scintillation seen using the DMSP satellite as a function of month and 
longitude during a solar max period. In Spring, severe scintillation was seen 
on ~75% of nights at longitudes that include Africa and Middle East, hot spots 
of military operations [9]. 
 
In general, geomagnetic storms produce degraded 
geolocation and a loss of accuracy in Electron Density 
Profiles and Total Electron Content (TEC).  Large 
gradients in electron density profiles cause geolocation 
errors.  In consequence, surveillance & intelligence 
applications  become  difficult.  There may be false 
returns, false targeting, blinding surveillance radars and 
multiple HF systems. Satellite communications 
(SATCOM) are also impacted due to signal interference 
and loss.   
 
• Satellite sensors can be blinded by energetic particle 
events, and then rapid degradation can set in.  For 
example, Micro Channel Plates (MCPs) can become 
saturated by MeV and GEV particles that impact them 
directly.  In the real world, Defense Meteorological 
Satellites (DMSP) which are relied on by military 
planners and operations personnel have MCP particle 
detectors which can degrade rapidly from high fluxes and 
may be degraded or even inoperable after storms.  Fig. 11 
shows one such event on DMSP-F16. 
 
 
Fig. 11. During an energetic particle event, MCP counts on DSP-F16 were 
high in both electron and ion channels and the instrument was blinded by high 
energy particles.  There are about 5 such events/solar cycle [8]. 
 
• And, finally, arcing can occur on satellites, and has been 
known to completely debilitate operational satellite 
systems. The charging of spacecraft, and its role in 
spacecraft anomalies due to electrostatic discharges, is 
well known. Charging is caused by energetic particles in 
the space environment.  The main sources of these 
particles are the Van Allen radiation belts, solar flares and 
substorms, and galactic cosmic rays.  There are two types 
of charging, surface charging and internal charging, also 
known as deep dielectric charging.   
 
a) The Nature of Arcing (a Threshold Phenomenon) 
 
In the space environment, satellites are exposed to a 
constant flux of electrically charged particles. When a charged 
particle strikes a satellite surface, it can penetrate into the 
satellite or deposit on the surface. Where it deposits depends 
on the energy as it hits the surface. Maxwell’s equations 
demand that in steady state the net current to the surface of the 
satellite be zero. Away from steady state, the charge will 
quickly build up (redistribute itself) so that the net current 
drops to zero.  As charge accumulates on the surface of a 
satellite, the potential (electric field) adjusts so that that at 
each point the net current is zero. If the surface is conductive 
the current flows along the surface until it becomes an 
equipotential. If the surface is resistive then it allows an 
electric field to develop across the surface with differential 
charge accumulation at different points. All surfaces contain 
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adsorbed material (gases) and if the electric potential across 
the surface exceeds the breakdown voltage of the surface 
material or possibly some of the adsorbed material then there 
will be an abrupt rearrangement of the charge which will be 
seen as an arc or electrostatic discharge (ESD). Arcs therefore 
occur when the electric field at a point becomes high enough 
for charges to be liberated and a cascade of ionization 
develops. Thus, arcing is a threshold phenomenon in electric 
field, which translates into a threshold in differential voltages, 
which is caused by a threshold of charge accumulation being 
reached.  
The sudden flow of electrons across the surface deposits 
heat and can therefore cause considerable damage.  The 
discharge also is a source of EMI which can lead to spacecraft 
noise and anomalies. This is surface charging and is caused by 
low energy electrons of 5-50 keV in GEO, 2-20 keV in PEO, 
or on high voltage arrays in LEO where low energy electrons 
may lead to secondary electron emission.  These low energy 
electrons do not penetrate the surface of the material. During 
the 1970's and 1980's, protection techniques were developed 
to try to mitigate the surface charging problem. Since 
anomalies continue to occur on spacecraft, investigation of 
deep dielectric charging was also required. 
 
b) Surface Arcing vs Deep-Dielectric Discharge 
 
Deep dielectric charging occurs when high energy 
electrons or ions penetrate the surface of, and deposit charge 
within, a dielectric material.  This is caused by electrons of 
200 keV-3 MeV, protons of > 10 MeV, or prompt SEPs or X-
rays (which cause internal ionization). If the deposition of 
incoming charged particles is greater than the charge leakage 
through the material, a large potential difference can build up 
in the material and lead to a discharge.  The basic problem is 
that high energy particles from the space environment 
penetrate the surface of the dielectric material, and lose energy 
until they stop somewhere within the material.  These stopped 
particles induce an electric field within the material.  This 
electric field causes the particles to move, producing a current 
in the material.  This current in turn influences the electric 
field.  The electric field continues to grow until equilibrium is 
reached between the flux of incoming particles and the 
particle flux leaving due to the current.  If the electric field 
exceeds the dielectric strength of the material before 
equilibrium is reached, a breakdown and subsequent 
electrostatic discharge occurs.   
 
c) The Case for Arcing as the Source of Satellite 
Anomalies 
 
     Several spacecraft failures have been associated with 
electrostatic discharges resulting from deep dielectric 
charging, including the $300 million Telesat Canada 
communications satellites ANIK E1 and E2, and the ESA 
spacecraft Olympus.  Other spacecraft have experienced 
switchings or anomalies due to electrostatic discharges 
resulting from deep dielectric charging, including Intelsat K,  
ECS-2 and ECS-4, and the Combined Release and Radiation 
Effects Spacecraft (CRRES).  It should also be noted that 
while some spacecraft have been affected by deep dielectric 
charging, other spacecraft of similar design and in operation at 
the same time have not been affected.  This may be due to 
aging of spacecraft materials, differences in environment with 
longitude or local time in orbit, or to the stochastic nature of 
arcing itself. 
 
     In some cases, spacecraft telemetry of housekeeping data 
can identify the reason for an anomaly.  In other cases, 
detection of arcing EMI or arc effects can give a positive 
identification.  In the vast majority of cases, however, 
statistics must be used to identify the source of spacecraft 
anomalies, as most satellites do not carry arc detectors or 
environmental diagnostic instruments. 
IV. ANALYZING SPACECRAFT ANOMALIES 
A. When and Where GEO Satellites Fail 
1) Where GEO Satellites Fail Due to Spacecraft 
Charging 
 
In Fig. 12, a plot of anomalies is shown for four 
different GEO satellites.  The data were obtained from [10].  It 
is typical for surface charging anomalies to be concentrated 
mainly in the midnight to morning sector of the orbit (local 
time, or LT from 0 hrs to 6 hrs).  There are several reasons 
hypothesized for this.  One is that geomagnetic substorms start 
at about the midnight point and proceed counterclockwise 
around the magnetosphere because of their origin in 
reconnecting stretched out antisolar field lines.  We will see 
another reason when we discuss the influence of eclipses on 
satellites. Deep-dielectric charging is not restricted to any 
specific orbital position, in keeping with the relative 
transparency of the magnetosphere to high energy electrons 
and protons at GEO altitudes.  Thus, arcs on solar arrays, 
instruments, or payloads exposed to the space environment 
will be concentrated to morning LT’s and arcs in shielded 
electronic boxes or underneath spacecraft thermal blankets 
will not be restricted to any particular LT values. 
 
Fig. 12.  Fig. 3 of [10], showing the LT dependence of primarily surface 
arcing anomalies. 
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2) When GEO Satellites Fail  
 
a) Number of GEO Satellites – A Normalizing Factor 
 
Fig. 13 shows a plot of the number of operational GEO 
satellites.  If we wish to investigate the solar cycle dependence 
of satellite anomalies, we must use the number of operational 
satellites as a normalizing factor, else we’ll be misled into 
believing the frequency of anomalies is increasing. 
 
 
Fig. 13.  The normalized number of GEO satellite anomalies versus month of 
year for 1994-2010.  The data were obtained from Satellite News Digest [12].   
 
b) Eclipse Seasons (near the Equinoxes) 
 
Surface arcing anomalies are concentrated toward times 
near the equinoxes for two reasons.  First there is the Russell-
McPherron effect [11], a geometrical effect making it easier 
for the CME and solar wind plasma to enter Earth’s 
magnetosphere at those times of year.  Secondly, GEO 
satellites only go into the Earth’s shadow when the sun is near 
the celestial equator, near the equinoxes.  This has two effects.  
Firstly, the satellites are cold in eclipse, increasing dielectric 
resistivities, and secondly, the lack of sunlight on spacecraft 
surfaces prevents photoemission, a key satellite discharging 
factor, during eclipses.  Then, when a satellite comes out of 
eclipse, its surface dielectrics have higher than normal 
resistivities (and thus  higher electric fields), are charged up a 
great deal, and then photoemission from sunlit surfaces 
partially discharges them, producing high differential voltages 
with surfaces in shade.  Such effects can be modeled with 
modern spacecraft charging codes, such as Nascap-2k.   
 
 Fig. 13 shows the normalized number of GEO 
satellite anomalies versus month of year for 1994-2010.  The 
data were obtained from Satellite News Digest [12].  The 
effect of eclipse seasons is clearly seen in this chart.  The 
anomalies that show this type of behavior are predominantly 
surface charging anomalies. 
 
Fig. 13. Non-mechanical GEO satellite anomalies from 1994-2010. 
 
a) Dependence on Type of Anomaly 
 
Although Fig. 13 shows all types of anomalies, the 
correlation with season is even stronger when anomalies of 
payload, power, and control processors are plotted, as in Fig. 
14.  Here, the data are from the SpaceTrak database [14].  
Rates of these anomalies during eclipse seasons are 50-90% 
higher than outside eclipse seasons. 
 
Some space weather-caused anomalies are not due to 
surface charging and surface ESD.  These deep-dielectric 
discharges typically affect different spacecraft systems than do 
surface discharges.  The types of these anomalies may be 
primarily those on mechanisms, beam antenna, telemetry, and 




Fig. 14.  Power, payload and control processor anomalies on GEO satellites 
through 2013.  Green months are eclipse seasons. 
 
Wong [15] has shown that the seasonality of upsets on 
GPS satellites does not follow the pattern above, and thus 
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b) Solar Cycle 
 
Just as the Sunspot Number varies throughout the solar 
cycle, so does the number of spacecraft anomalies.  In Fig. 15 
is a plot of yearly normalized numbers of spacecraft 
anomalies, the yearly averaged Sunspot Number, and the 
yearly number of days of Kp ≥ 6 for 1994-2010.  Here it is 
obvious that satellite anomalies roughly follow the sunspot 
cycle with pronounced minima at sunspot minima.  All types 
of anomalies are included, because surface charging and dep-
dielectric charging are both related to the solar activity. 
 
 
Fig. 15.  Yearly normalized numbers of spacecraft anomalies, yearly averaged 
Sunspot Number, and yearly number of days of Kp ≥ 6 for 1994-2010. 
 
c) Correlation with Kp ≥ 6 
 
The normalized yearly number of GEO spacecraft 
anomalies is significantly correlated with the yearly number  
of days with moderate geomagnetic storms (Kp ≥ 6), as shown 
in Fig. 16. This is consistent with the threshold nature of 
arcing, and implies that spacecraft surface charging may not 
be sufficient to produce arcing for Kp < 6. 
 
 
Fig. 16. Normalized yearly GEO satellite anomalies versus the yearly number 





d) Correlation with Kp High All Day 
 
While surface charging and arcing follows electron 
fluxes closely, deep-dielectric charging for unshielded cabling 
may depend more closely on fluences over a time period of a 
day or more.  As is shown in Fig. 17, the normalized yearly 
number of GEO spacecraft anomalies is also significantly 
correlated with the yearly number of days with the sum of all 
Kp periods being 35 or more.  That is the sum of all eight 3 
hour periods in the UT day.  This implies an average Kp for 
the entire day of ~ 4.4 or more may provide enough energetic 
particle fluence for some interior charging to produce arcing 
conditions.  This is consistent with the recommendations of 
Garrett and Whittlesey, a 10 hour fluence threshold. 
 
 
Fig. 17.  Yearly normalized numbers of GEO satellite anomalies versus yearly 
number of days with Kp sum > 35.0 for 1994-2010. 
 
e) Fluences of “Killer Electrons” 
 
For some satellite anomalies, such as deep-dielectric 
discharges inside shielded “Faraday” cages, as recommended 
in NASA-HDBK-4002a and NASA TP-2361, electrons of > 2 
MeV or protons of  > 10 MeV are required to penetrate the 
shielding.  J. Allen [16] has termed such highly energetic 
electrons “killer” electrons. M. Bodeau has [17] published a 
plot showing that for some of these anomalies, a charge 
bleedoff time of weeks or months is needed to produce a 
fluence that causes these anomalies.  Fig. 18 is one version of 
that plot.  In other words, charges may build up for days, 
weeks, or months inside spacecraft interiors and eventually 
lead to electric fields high enough for breakdown.  Ferguson et 
al [18] have shown that for cold dielectrics, charge may even 
build up for years and eventually cause discharges. 
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Fig. 18.  Spacecraft anomalies with different accumulated charge thresholds 
and time constants for charge bleedoff. 
 
f) Very Dangerous Periods 
 
• Eclipse Seasons (equinoxes) – satellites charge more in 
eclipse (no photoemission, cold conditions) 
• Equinoxes – Russell-McPherron Effect – Interplanetary 
Magnetic Field (IMF) couples to magnetosphere better  
• Time of Day – anomalies prefer the morning-side after 
eclipse (differential discharging from photoemission) 
• High Max Kp – Days of Kp >~ 6 are most dangerous 
• Extended Periods of High Kp – Days of Kp Sum > 35 are 
most dangerous 
• Immediately following X-class flares 
• 2-4 days following a CME on the Sun, or when a CIR 
reaches Earth 
• After prolonged periods (months or years) of high energy 
(> 2 MeV) electron flux spikes 
 
V. CLASSIC EXAMPLE – GALAXY 15 ANOMALY 
A much studied recent spacecraft anomaly was that of the 
Galaxy 15, a commercial GEO satellite using the Star Bus 
built by Orbital Sciences Corp. and used to relay DirecTV 
programs.  In April, 2010, immediately following impact of a 
CME with Earth’s magnetosphere, Galaxy 15 stopped 
accepting commands from its controllers and, because station-
keeping could not be maintained, started drifting around GEO 
orbit.  Unfortunately, it was still capable of relaying any TV 
signals it received back to Earth, and it became a source of 
interference for all other GEO satellites it happened to pass.  
Also, housekeeping functions were unimpaired, so it 
maintained power and “operations” until its momentum 
wheels finally saturated in December, 2010 and it underwent a 
reset and became operational once more.  Although the cause 
of the anomaly remains officially proprietary, it was clearly 
caused by the space environment because of the timing of the 
failure.  In what follows, we recount what was known by the 
authors as of January, 2011 [19]. 
A. Generic Spacecraft Nascap-2k Model 
In order to estimate the charging that occurred on Galaxy 
15 in a non-proprietary manner, a generic Nascap-2k 
geometrical model was used that incorporates many features 
of commercial GEO satellites.  It is shown in Fig.  18.  In the 
Nascap-2k modeling, the uneclipsed sun was allowed to 
impinge on the solar cells, and in eclipse the sun was “turned 
off.”  Materials properties were the default values for Nascap-
2k.  The satellite environment history was kindly furnished by 
J. Rodriguez as measured by the NOAA GOES-13 and GOES-
15 satellites.  We assume that Galaxy 15, only about 30 
degrees in longitude from the nearest GOES satellite, 
experienced the same electron and ion environment. 
 
Fig. 18.  The generic Nascap-2k geometrical model used to estimate charging 
on Galaxy 15. 
B. Nascap-2k Model Charging History During Galaxy 15 
Eclipse 
In the case of Galaxy 15, the geomagnetic storm impacted 
the magnetosphere while the satellite was in eclipse.   At the 
height of the storm, the temperature moments  calculated from 
GOES-15  electron flux measurements were the highest on 
record, a huge 109 K (86.4 keV) temperature, but the electron 
densities were relatively low (< 0.084 cm-3).    
Using these parameters, and assuming an initially 
uncharged, spacecraft, we obtained in Fig. 19 a plot of the 




Fig. 19.  Charging history of a “generic” spacecraft in the Galaxy 15 eclipse 
environment. 
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After only 200 seconds of charging, the spacecraft would have 
reached a whopping -87,000 V potential with respect to the 
surrounding plasma, and would have achieved at least a 1200 
V differential potential between its body and solar array 
wings. 
C. Charging History after Galaxy 15 Eclipse to Time of 
Anomaly 
Fig. 20 is the time history of charging for the “generic” 
Galaxy 15 satellite, in sunlight after eclipse, starting from the 
last eclipse values and continuing for 1800 seconds (1/2 hour), 
the time after eclipse when the Galaxy 15 event occurred.  For 
this period a constant plasma was assumed with the density 
and temperatures at the time of the event. 
 
 
Fig. 20.  Charging history of a “generic” spacecraft in the Galaxy 15 post-
eclipse environment. 
 
Finally, from the potentials on spacecraft surfaces shown in 
Fig. 20, it can be seen that the maximum differential potential 
achieved before the event was about 700 V, well within 
typical arcing range for GEO spacecraft. 
 
D. The Case for Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) on Galaxy 
15 
 
It is almost a complete certainty that the Galaxy 15 event was 
due to electrostatic discharge.  Among the telling signs are the 
following: 
• The event occurred during and eclipse season, 
• A rare strong geomagnetic substorm (Kp > 7) hit while 
Galaxy 15 was in eclipse, 
• A record high electron temperature (> 4 times NASA 
worst-case) probably led to record high absolute charging 
levels (Nascap-2k modeling), 
• The anomaly occurred a short time after eclipse exit, a 
time of many other spacecraft ESD related anomalies 
over the years,  
• The MLI blanket-penetrating (NIST codes) electron 
fluence at energies  E > 200 keV was above the threshold 
level (NASA-HDBK-4002a) for deep dielectric 
discharge, and 
• Modeling shows that surface differential potentials were 
probably above the threshold level for plasma arcing. 
 
VI. A FEW SEVERE SATELLITE ANOMALIES AND THEIR 
PROBABLE CAUSES 
Although catalogs of spacecraft anomalies run into the 
thousands of events, and untold numbers of anomalies are not 
severe enough to be reported or operational work-arounds 
have prevented their reporting, a few notable recent anomalies 
stand out: 
• Anik E-1 and E-2 (1994) – deep dielectric electron 
charging during severe geomagnetic storm led to 
communications disruptions lasting for days 
• Tempo-2 and PAS-6 (1997) – sustained arcs from 
geomagnetic substorm ESDs caused complete Loss of 
Mission (LOM) 
• ADEOS-2 (2003) – micrometeoroid strike during auroral 
charging event caused complete LOM (loss of mission) 
• Galaxy 15 (2010) – ESD caused electronics problem 
coming out of eclipse during severe geomagnetic 
substorm, recovered after 8 months adrift 
• DMSP-15 (2011) – computer upset after large total 
internal dose from X-class flare X-rays 
• Echostar 129 (2011) – temporary (24 hr) 
pointing/positioning loss after huge peak in GOES > 2 
MeV (“killer’) electrons 
• SkyTerra-1 operated by LightSquared (March 7, 2012) – 
knocked out for 3 weeks due to SEU caused by energetic 
protons & CME 
• Other March 2012 anomalies – Venus Express, 
HughesNet-Spaceway 3  
 
 
VII. SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
According to the 2010 National Space Policy [20] and the 
2011 National Security Space Strategy [21] space situational 
awareness is a key goal for the US Department of Defense 
(DoD).  The DoD must determine, in real-time if possible, 
whether anomalies are due to the Space Weather or to hostile 
actions.   Also, operations may be affected by efforts to 
prevent space weather-related outages, so Space Weather 
prediction and real-time anomaly resolution very important to 
US Security. 
 
The military has long relied on long-range communications 
as have key commercial concerns such as banking.  Both the 
US and German air forces understood the potential impact of 
space weather on communications during World War II.  
Indeed, the US Air Force established a Geophysics Directorate 
soon after it founded its first laboratory, the Air Force 
Cambridge Research Laboratory, in the late 1940s and then 
(1952) set up the Sacramento Peak Observatory to study solar 
effects on the environment relative to Air Force operations.  
Today these Space Weather research units have evolved into 
the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Battlespace Environment 
Laboratory (AFRL/BEL) the Solar Optical Observing 
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Network (SOON) and the National Solar Observatory (NSO).  
Space weather remains a major concern for all aerospace 
operations today.  But there are several particular aspects of 
space weather that warrant particular attention now. 
 
As the military faces increased competition for scarce 
resources it has turned to commercial and private sector assets 
to supplement, and even replace military capabilities.  This is 
particularly true in communications, whether space-based, 
ground-based or internet-based. We are now also relying on 
civil and commercial space services for crucial data such as 
imagery.  However, these commercial assets seldom have the 
same degree of protection that military systems do.  They tend 
not to be designed to be as effective as military systems 
against either man-made or natural threats such as space 
weather.  Additionally, the economy upon which US strength 
is based is increasingly dependent, and vulnerable to space 
weather effects.  It’s clear that a major event such as the 1859 
Carrington effect would devastate civil and military 
communications, as well as potentially destroy the global 
economy.  It has been estimated that a Carrington event now 
could blow out thousands of transformers on the nation’s 
power grid, and it would be months before replacements could 
be put into place and full electrical power could be restored.  
And the probability of extreme events is not insignificant.  On 
July 23, 2012, the Sun launched a CME that, had it been 
directed at Earth, is estimated to have been as severe as the 
1859 Carrington event [22]. 
 
However, there are potentially devastating problems at 
much lower levels of space environmental disturbances.  A 
recent paper by Schrijver and Rabanal [23] shows that 
commercial users believe they could use space weather data to 
mitigate more routine, but nonetheless serious impacts to 
routine services such as GPS positioning and even commercial 
power. 
 
Data now emerging shows that many routine outages on 
such utilities as the power grid are highly correlated with 
routine space weather activity.  Even the rate of lightning 
strike during storms has been correlated with space weather 
activity [24]. This raises an additional concern.  Today, 
routine problems with the internet are often difficult to 
distinguish as to origin – is it manmade or natural?  A 
significant attack or degradation in critical services could be 
masked by space weather disturbances.  It may take some 
time, and a deliberate attack could do significant damage 
before its true nature was discerned.  It’s thus crucial to much 
better understand and predict the specific impact of space 
weather on routine operations, particularly commercial and 






VIII. PREVENTING AND MITIGATING ANOMALIES 
 
A. How to Design to Prevent Space Weather Charging-
Related Anomalies 
 
There are many ways to design spacecraft to prevent space 
weather charging-related anomalies.  Among them are the 
following: 
• Harden all vital electronics and place in well-shielded 
Faraday cage (0.5 mm of Al or greater, NASA TP-2361 
[25], NASA-HDBK-4002a [26]) 
• Use grounded conductive surface coatings everywhere 
(with high secondary electron emission and low 
photoemission, if possible), even on solar arrays, to 
prevent differential surface charging (per Shu Lai, 2011, 
“Spacecraft Charging” [27]) 
• No ungrounded or unshielded conductors (Galaxy 15 
failure mechanism, NASA TP-2361), including for 
attached payloads 
• Use a well validated spacecraft charging code – SPIS 
(ESA), MUSCAT (JAXA), or Nascap-2k (USAF, NASA) 
• Design and test arrays to prevent ESDs and sustained arcs 
(Tempo-2 failure mechanism, NASA-STD-4005 [28], 
NASA-HDBK-4006 [29], ISO 11221 [30]) 
• Use accelerated life testing to ensure that end-of-life 
(EOL) materials properties are the same or better than at 
the beginning-of-life (BOL), so surface charging may be 
prevented throughout the spacecraft life  
• Design spacecraft to prevent deep dielectric discharges 
(NASA-HDBK-4002A) 
• Stop flying blind. Include small, lightweight internal 
charge and/or surface charge monitors in spacecraft 
designs, as was done with some Intelsat satellites, so that 
hazard warnings can be issued and evaluated in real time, 
allowing sensitive electronics to be put in safe mode as 
needed and if possible 
B. Operations to Mitigate Space Weather-Related Satellite 
Anomalies 
• Upload software that resets after SEUs.  This would have 
mitigated Galaxy 15 and  SkyTerra-1. 
• Monitor space environments and charging predictions 
from real-time spacecraft charging models, the Space 
Weather Prediction Center (SWPC), the Air Force 
Weather Agency (AFWA), The Space Environmental 
Anomalies Expert System, Real-Time (SEAESRT) [31], 
etc. 
• When severe Space Weather is predicted, turn off 
sensitive electronics if possible, such as thrusters, focal-
plane arrays, MCPs, electronic latching relay circuits, etc. 
• Shunt arrays (or in LEO feather them into the wake) when 
severe charging is likely and/or when coming out of 
eclipse. 
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C. Techniques to Mitigate Space Weather-Related Earth 
Problems 
 
1) Use “Smart-Grids” to route power around problems 
2) Have plenty of spare high voltage transformers on-
hand 
3) Reduce absolute reliance on satellite systems 
4) Have backup systems in place for: 
a. Time-keeping (atomic clocks),  
b. Communications (cell phones, microwave 
towers),  
c. Geolocation (celestial navigation, dead-
reckoning),  
d. Power (emergency generators, batteries, 
hydroelectric, solar, wind) 
e. Currency (cash vs ATM or credit cards) 
 
IX. SPACE WEATHER - SUMMARY 
Space Weather is important to our technological 
civilization. All major societal systems are affected by space 
weather, on Earth and in space. Space Weather will get worse 
before it gets better.  Solar Max is happening right now, and 
Satellite Anomalies due to Space Weather are more common 
after the sunspot peak. Proper designs and suitable operations 
can mitigate space weather effects on Earth and in space. 
Eventually, Earth will experience another “Carrington event.” 
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